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1 Introduction
FIDIC is the acronym of International Federation of Consulting Engineers (the
abbreviation represents the French version of the name). Founded in 1913 FIDIC
has now become an international federation of national associations of consult-
ing Engineers including 67 Member Associations from all parts of the world.
The series of standard contract forms stipulated by FIDIC has become inter-
national standards in project management, including civil, mechanical, elec-
tricity, medicine engineering projects (for a comprehensive survey, please check
www.fidic.org for more details).
In this paper we combine the defeasible logic of institutionalised agency [3, 1,
4] with the defeasible logic of temporalised normative positions [5]. The resulting
logic offers a computationally oriented (non-monotonic) formal framework for
the representation of normative-based contract management. In particular the
logic offers facilities to represent abstract agency (implementing a “brings it
about” modal operator), counts-as conditionals, and normative conditionals for
obligations, permissions, prohibitions and violations. The temporal extension
allows us to reason with deadlines as well as the initiation and termination of
normative positions.
The focus of the paper is to demonstrate that the proposed logical framework
is capable to represent and to implement real life contract management stan-
dards. In particular we propose a logical encoding of one clause of the FIDIC
regulation: Clause 67 about the rules of the disputes and the corresponding
procedures of solving the disputes. The encoding provides an executable speci-
fication of the clause, and we test it against a simple scenario.
2 Logical Framework
The logical framework is based on defeasible logic. Defeasible Logic is a rule
based non-monotonic formalism. A rule in Defeasible Logic corresponds to a
relationships between a set of premises (literals) and a conclusion (literal). In
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Defeasible Logic we have three types of rules: strict rules, which are rules in the
classical sense, a1, . . . , an → b, meaning that b is a definite/indisputable con-
clusion of a1, . . . , an when these are indisputable; defeasible rules, a1, . . . , an ⇒
b, meaning that usually b is a conclusion of a1, . . . , an unless there is some
stronger evidence against it. Finally we have defeaters. Defeaters are the weak-
est relationships between a set of premises and a conclusions, a defeater like
a1, . . . , an ; b, is can be understood as a reason to prevent the derivation of
¬b from a1, . . . , an, but not to support the conclusion of b from the same set of
premises.
Beside the above classification of rule based on their strength, we have a
second classification based on the type of conclusion (mode) we have: in this
paper we consider “counts-as” rules (which will also be used as the basic inferen-
tial mechanism of the logic), “results-in” rules, and “obligation” rules. Defeaters
have a special meaning for obligation rules, instead of creating a new obligation,
they terminate an existing one.
To capture the temporal dimension, we introduce (1) temporalised literals,
e.g., a : t meaning that a holds at time t where t is a timestamp, and (2) for
each rule we specify whether the conclusion is transient, i.e., it holds only for
a particular instant, or permanent, i.e., it continues to hold until a terminating
event occurs.
Based on the above discussion we can have rules like:
a1 : t1, . . . an : tn ⇒perC b : t (1)
a1 : t1, . . . an : tn ⇒trEj b : t (2)
a1 : t1, . . . an : tn ⇒perOj b : t (3)
a1 : t1, . . . an : tn ;
per
Oj
b : t (4)
Here (1), a counts-as rule, states that in the context of the FIDIC contract under
analysis if ai holds at time ti (for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n), then we are allowed to assert
that b holds at time t, and, since the rule is labelled as persistent, the effect b
will hold after t until some event eventually terminates the validity of b. For (2),
a results-in rule, the meaning is that if ai holds at time ti (for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n),
then we are allowed to assert that agent j does b at time t (or j brings is about
that b at time t, Ejb : t). However, this is a transient rule, so we cannot assert
that j achieved b at a time t′, t′ > t. Rule (3) is an obligation rule that specifies
that agent j has the obligation b at time t (Ojb : t), when the conditions ai
to an are satisfied at the appropriate times, and that the obligation persists,
until a discharging event occurs. Finally, (4) terminates the obligation on ¬b
(prohibition of b) at time t. For further details see [4, 5, 3, 2].
3 Encoding Clause 67 in Defeasible Logic
Clause 67 of FIDIC regulation sets down condition to begin dispute and to
handle them. The encoding for this clause has two parts: in the first part we
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put down some general rules about disputes and then we have specific parts for
each of the four articles of the clause. We include only a few rules to illustrate
the main features of our framework.
In the first stage, the Employer or the Contractor should send the dispute to
the Engineer in writing. Then the Engineer has at most 12 weeks to consider
this referred dispute and draw his decision towards it. In this period both parties
of the Employer and the Contractor should go on to obey the Engineer’s
original/old decision/certificate about the dispute matter, which has already
encoded in r4.1general and r4.2general (not shown here).
Several actions needed to be set here.
Action A1 (the Employer or the Contractor) to refer a dispute to the Engi-
neer.
Action A2 (the Engineer) to draw a notice of decision.
R1.1.1 :EemA1 : t1⇒trC BeginOfDispute : t1
R1.1.2 :EcoA1 : t1⇒trC BeginOfDispute : t1
R1.2 :BeginOfDispute : t1⇒perO EenA2 : [t1, t1 + 84]
R1.3.1 :(EenA2 : t2), (t1 < t2 < t1 + 84)⇒trC NoticeOfDecision : t2
R1.3.2 :(EenA2 : t2), (t1 < t2 < t1 + 84);
per
O ¬EenA2 : t2 + 1
The interval representation, i.e., [t1, t1 + 84] in rule R1.2 is just syntactic sugar
for a second rule that terminate the obligation at time t1 + 84. Please pay
attention to R1.3.2. It means if the Engineer fulfils his obligation successfully
at time point t then she is discharged from that obligation form time point t+1.
From the deontic rule R1.2 we get the corresponding violation rule R1.2.1.
If the Engineer does not draw a conclusion in 84 days, it is a violation to the
general rule R1.2general as described before.
R1.2.1 : (BeginOfDispute : t1), (OenEenA2 : t1 + 84),
(Een¬A2 : t1 + 84)⇒C V len((em), R1.2general) : t1 + 84
This violation would trigger the general rule R3.2general, so the Engineer cannot
get payment at time point t1 + 84 for the related dispute solution work.
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